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This paper studies cooperation and social screening among expert chess players. It employs a 
large international panel dataset  with controls for fixed effects, age, sex, nationality and 
playing strength where the latter accounts for productivity differences. With a female share 
below 15 percent both sexes screen women by cooperating more with men, especially 
professionals. With a female share above 15 percent, women cooperate more with women. 
Countrymen cooperate more than players of different nationalities, and language and 
geographic proximity also affect cooperation. The paper gives support to quota-based 
admission of women and minority groups in intellectually demanding professions.  
 
Keywords: Gender, female share, costs, minority.  
Classification codes: J16 
 
                                                 
∗ I am grateful for the comments by Christer Gerdes, Eskil Wadensjö and the participants at the SOFI seminar.  
⊗ Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University, SE-10691 Stockholm, 
patrik.gransmark@sofi.su.se .    3 
1     Introduction 
It is a recognized fact that women are underrepresented in various fields of the labor market. 
particularly the top positions in politics, public and government administration, academia and 
corporate management. There are also other groups that are underrepresented in the labor 
market. These groups are often minorities which can be described as a group with a cultural 
background different from that of the dominant group. Broadly defined, cultural background 
may include language, religious beliefs, ethnic background, race, sex, sexual preferences, 
neighborhood upbringing, schooling, or membership of  social organizations. Nepotistic 
behavior is a frequent explanation of why some groups are underrepresented in high-status 
positions. This follows as cultural background may have substantial influence on a recruiter’s 
choice of employee. Underrepresentation of women in high-status positions has  been 
observed in most industrialized countries, even in markedly equality-aware societies such as 
Sweden (Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman 2003; Booth 2006).
1
                                                 
1 For a discussion on the lack of women in academia see Jonung and Ståhlberg (2008) and references therein. 
 A similar pattern is seen for 
other groups. It has been shown that dominant groups have better access to social networks, 
which increases the probability of acquiring a job through personal contacts. The 
phenomenon of informal methods for job seeking may be as important as that of formal 
methods  (Behtoui 2008;  Calvó-Armengol 2004). Additionally, if the dominant group is 
overrepresented among the recruiters for high-status jobs and if these recruiters prefer to hire 
employees with  a similar background to  themselves, then they will  act as gatekeepers, 
reducing the probabilities of other-group applicants obtaining high-status jobs. It is often 
suggested that taste or statistical discrimination are  involved in such scenarios;  see for 
instance Becker (1957) and Phelps (1972). Cornell and Welch (1996), however, developed a 
model that “can explain how discrimination, such as ‘racism’ – defined as the tendency to 
hire or fraternize with people where cultural backgrounds are similar to one’s own – can   4 
develop spontaneously even when all individuals are rational, have no preference for people 
of their own type, and believe, correctly, that there are no average differences between people 
of various types.” These assumptions distinguish the model from the work of Becker (1957), 
who assumes that individuals have racial preferences, and from Akerlof (1976) who shows 
that racism, once it exists, can be self-perpetuating but does not explain how it arises. The 
authors argue that, coming from a similar background, an interviewer can interpret verbal and 
non-verbal signals more efficiently and thereby infer the quality of the applicant with more 
accuracy. By screening applicants with different cultural backgrounds, the interviewer is 
more likely to find a person with higher-than-average quality among applicants with a similar 
cultural background.  
This paper examines the social screening behavior when people choose with whom to 
cooperate. It addresses the question of whether certain background characteristics play a role 
in the decision process. By exploiting an extensive dataset from international chess games 
performed by expert chess players, it is possible to control for the background characteristics 
gender, nationality, and age. Moreover, the data offer a control for playing strength which 
accounts for differences in productivity.    
To be able to measure cooperation on a metric scale I explore the existence of pre-
arranged draws in chess, that is, draws agreed before the game is started. Both players must 
agree for an arranged draw to occur and therefore the concept of pre-arranged draws is a 
measure of cooperation between two players. Moul and Nye (2009) apply a similar method 
by considering pre-arranged draws in chess to establish the existence of “strategic draws”.  
Previous studies have noted that there is a common set of skills appropriate for the 
learned professions, high-status professions, as well as for expert chess players. This holds 
not least because success in these different areas is associated with intelligence and expertise 
(Bilalić, McLeod and Gobet 2007, p. 460). Also, as chess is a game between two players, it   5 
constitutes a highly competitive setting, thereby reflecting the nature of what is daily routine 
for many actors in the corporate and governmental arenas, and also in academia.  
For a number of years strategic aspects of playing chess have become an established 
analytical tool in cognitive psychology. A landmark establishing chess as an analytical tool 
was the introduction of the so-called “Elo”-scale that made it possible to compare the strength 
of chess players on a metric scale. Following Elo (1978), it has become possible to measure 
skills on objective grounds, i.e. there are no “subjective assessments” (Chabris and Glickman, 
2006, p. 1040).
2
“Chess has numerous strengths for the purposes of econometric analysis. First, the outcomes 
are clear and objective: a win, a draw, or a loss. Moreover, a perfect record of all games is 
available for virtually all important championship and high-level tournaments games of the 
modern era. Most important of all is that there exists a rating system that is a précis and 
accurate reflection of the performances of players and an excellent indicator of the relative 
strengths of players. These ratings are the best unbiased estimates of relative strengths and the 
differences in ratings correspond to the likelihood that the stronger player will defeat the weaker 
(cf. Elo, 1978). These Elo-style ratings have since been applied not only to other sports but also 
to studies of revealed preference rankings in college selection (cf. Avery et al., 2005).” (p. 11) 
 In a study by Moul and Nye (2009) the authors write that:   
As argued by different scholars in the field, e.g. Gobet (2005), Ross (2006) and Roring 
(2008), chess even has the potential to be applied to questions that concern issues outside the 
world of chess. For example, one result found by chess research is that it takes about ten years 
                                                 
2 The Elo-rating is calculated through an algorithm that starts out from the assumption of a normal distribution 
of the chess players’ strength. It takes into account the difference in current Elo between the two players (before 
the game) and the result of the game (1-0, 0-1 or ½-½). Elo-points are then added to or subtracted from the 
players’ Elo score. Consequently, the Elo-rating is a cardinal measure that evolves over time. An Elo rating that 
is superior to the rating of the opponent by 200 points corresponds to a winning probability of 75 percent.   6 
of intense learning and hard work to become an expert, a time frame that also fits into “arts, 
sports, science, and the professions” (Gobet 2005, p. 185).  
Undoubtedly, chess players constitute a select group which is not representative of the 
whole population. Nevertheless, one can argue that there is a common denominator between 
chess players and employees in intellectually demanding professions. Furthermore, it has 
recently become common practice to look at high-skilled athletes and sports competitions for 
the purpose of analyzing economic issues. For example, Duggan and Levitt (2002) assess 
corruption in the world of sumo wrestling by analyzing the frequency of arranged draws. The 
authors recognize that sumo wrestling in itself is not of much interest in terms of economics 
but that economists can learn about the impact of corruption by studying it. From a game 
theoretical  perspective, Levitt, List and Sadoff  (2009)  use  expert chess players in a lab 
experiment where they investigate whether it is reasonable to test backward induction through 
the centipede game. 
Compared with sports economics, chess has the advantage that different groups can be 
compared more easily as there is no requirement of physical strength. Men and women can be 
compared on an equal basis, which is not always the case in sports economics. Indeed, chess 
is one of the  few competitive events where men and women are  in direct competition.
3
This paper adds to the literature by showing that background characteristics matter 
when we choose with whom to cooperate and that minorities/women choose to cooperate 
with the dominant group if the minority share is less than 15 percent. The findings also show 
that there is a productivity cost for the minority if the minority share is less than 30 percent 
but this cost disappears when the share is greater than 30 percent. Moreover, the screening 
 
Moreover, the rules of chess are the same all over the world, which facilitates comparisons 
even further.  
                                                 
3 For a discussion about women’s situation in the chess world, see Shahade (2005).    7 
effect is substantially stronger among professionals than among amateurs. Furthermore, 
countrymen cooperate more than players  of different nationalities,  and language and 
geographic proximity are important factors for cooperation across nations. The paper employs 
a large international and non-experimental panel dataset covering eleven years where the 
main advantage is the chance to hold constant for differences in productivity. In addition, the 
control variables for gender, age, nationality and individual fixed effects help to reduce the 
impact of confounders such as cultural differences.  
   The next section provides a theoretical background and Section 3 discusses the data 
and statistics. Section 4 presents the results of the estimations and Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2     Conceptual framework
 
It is well known that people are able to interpret a host of culturally intermediated signals 




give a concrete example, a recruiter at a job interview receives signals from the applicants 
through verbal communication but also from body language. If the applicant has the same 
background as the interviewer then more signals are received and the interpretation of the 
signals is facilitated. Cornell and Welch (1996) argue that by sharing a similar background an 
interviewer can interpret the signals more efficiently and is therefore able to infer the quality 
of the applicant with more accuracy. By screening the applicants, the interviewer can hire a 
person with higher-than-average quality. 
 
                                                 
4 See Scheffen (1971) and Mehrabian (1981).    8 
The model 
The theoretical framework builds on the model developed by Cornell  and  Welch (1996) 
where they focus on an interview situation between a recruiter and applicants. They assume 
that the quality (Q) of the applicants is distributed uniformly from zero to one. All other 
employee characteristics are held constant so that output only depends on the quality of the 
individual. The recruiter attempts to maximize the expected production of the prospective 
employee. A recruiter who  receives no signals will infer the expected quality of each 
applicant to be ½. The screening process provides the recruiter with a number of n signal(s) s 
about each applicant, where  { } H L s , ∈  (low, high). Signal and quality are assumed to be 
correlated in that the probability of observing the H signal is Q. For example, if the quality of 
an applicant is 3
2 , then the recruiter receives the signal H with probability 3
2 , and so on. When 
the recruiter receives more information about the applicants (more signals), the variance of 
the inferred quality increases. If the recruiter receives more signals when the applicant has a 
similar background, then the recruiter will benefit from choosing an employee with the same 
background.  
The model is based on two premises: that screening of other people is routine in daily 
life and that people are able to distinguish between high- and low-ability individuals more 
accurately when the people being sorted are of a similar cultural type. The critical assumption 
is that it is easier to interpret signals from people with similar cultural background and that 
this reduces measurement error for an evaluator. In Cornell and Welch's model not only is 
information incomplete, but individuals can be strategically deceptive and the ability to detect 
deception is culturally limited. Their model predicts discrimination not only by majority 
group interviewers against minority group applicants but also by minority group interviewers 
against majority group applicants. Furthermore, it predicts that screening discrimination 
should occur primarily in sectors in which inferred quality is important and in which it is   9 
more efficient to screen ex ante than to measure on-the-job performance ex post. This fits 
well with the high-status professions as the responsibility of the employee is usually higher 
with a greater potential damage in case of failure and on-the-job training is also more costly.
5
Although Cornell and Welch discuss their model in an interview setting, it is applicable 
to various areas of life. This is so because one of their premises is that the signaling and 
interpretation of signals must be one of life's daily routines. A model similar to that of Cornell 
and Welch is the language model developed by Lang (1986):   
  
“Language refers to all aspects of verbal and nonverbal communication by which individuals 
transmit information. Blacks and whites or men and women can be said to ‘speak’ different 
languages in this sense.”  
He states that people will cooperate more if they “speak” the same language and that 
the competitive market will tend to minimize communication through segregation. He adds 
that those cooperation costs that cannot be eliminated will be borne by the minority group, 
through  learning the majority “language”. Moreover, he assumes that there are only two 
states: having a common language (communication) and not having a common language 
(non-communication). He further requires that there must be communication for cooperation 
to take place. 
 
Institutional chess background   
There are three possible results in chess: a win, a draw or a loss which give one point, half a 
point and zero points respectively. A draw can be offered by a player and accepted or denied 
by the opponent at any time during the game. There are no rules regulating the minimum 
number of moves that have to be played before the players can agree upon a draw except that 
the game must have started. For obvious reasons, early draws are not very popular with 
spectators and organizers. In chess there is a concept called pre-arranged draws  which 
                                                 
5 For a more complete explanation of the model, see Cornell and Welch (1996).    10 
implies that the players informally agree upon a draw before the game starts. A semi-
arranged draw implies that although the players did not consider a draw before the game 
started, they signaled early on in the game that they were satisfied with a peaceful outcome. 
In what follows I will refer to both pre-arranged and semi-arranged draws by simply calling 
them arranged draws. The purpose of agreeing to an arranged draw is that it gives time for 
recovery and preparation for the next game which may be more important. To play chess for 
about five hours a day for several consecutive days can be exhausting and a day’s rest can be 
quite valuable in practice. Moul and Nye (2009) write that:  
”…chess is not simply stressful but also notoriously tiring. We [they] hypothesize that very 
strong players /…/ can improve their performance against other players by agreeing to early or pre-
arranged draws”. (p. 11) 
 
To avoid the arranged draw being too obvious and to offer at least a minimum of play 
to the spectators, the players make a few moves before they shake hands and split the point. 
The position after the first twenty moves of a chess game between two equally strong players 
is still fairly balanced, in status quo. Thereafter the position will become more complicated 
and sooner or later there will be an advantage to one side or the other or the players will agree 
upon a draw. The implication is that an arranged draw typically depends on the players, not 
the position on the board, whereas a draw after more than twenty moves depends more on the 
position and less on the players. Accordingly, I define an arranged draw as a game that lasts 
for ten to nineteen moves and ends with a draw. The argument for this limitation is that the 
chess opening theory lasts for fifteen to twenty moves and to pass that number of moves 
would be both dangerous and laborious if the goal is to accomplish a draw. Moul and Nye 
(2009) write:  
“Hard-fought games that end in draws are more likely to last longer than collusive or pre-
arranged draws. The latter are more likely to be agreed to at an earlier stage when the position   11 
on the board is still not fully resolved and it is not clear that one player should win. At a later 
stage the likelihood is much greater that the position will clearly favor one or the other player.”  
(p.14) 
 
Furthermore, the players tend to “play” more than ten  moves to camouflage the 
arranged draw. There are situations in tournaments when both players could secure their 
respective final placement by agreeing to an arranged draw and where there is no payoff from 
trying to win. In these cases the players are expected to agree to an arranged draw. In such 
situations there is no use in “playing” more than just a few moves. For this reason the draws 
in one to nine moves are typically different from the ones in ten to nineteen moves. The first 
depends more on the tournament situation, and less on the background characteristics of the 
players. Thus, the critical interval in this study is the arranged draws agreed to in ten to 
nineteen moves. Of course, these intervals are somewhat arbitrary but in practical play they 
are probably sufficiently realistic. For an arranged draw to take place, the players must 
communicate and agree to the draw. As they are mutually dependent on each other, they must 
cooperate. The analytical approach in this paper is to compare the probability of cooperation 
if the background characteristics of the players are of same  sex/opposite  sex and same 
nationality/different nationality, respectively.  
It would not be particularly controversial to claim that the verbal and non-verbal 
communication differs between age groups. Both verbal and non-verbal languages evolve 
over time and vocabulary and gestures may differ substantially across age. When a 25-year-
old communicates with a 75-year-old the risk of misunderstanding is higher than when two 
50-year-olds communicate. From this perspective, one could expect that cooperation is more 
likely within the same age groups than between people of different age groups. 
There are two factors that have to be taken into account when we choose with whom to 
cooperate. First, it is important to be sure that the opponent will fulfill the draw agreement.   12 
Second, if the opponent turns down the draw offer, then you have revealed that you would 
have preferred not to play and that you may not be totally fit for the fight. Consequently, a 
player can benefit from choosing to cooperate with an opponent of similar background as it is 
easier to predict their intention. By interpreting the signals (high or low reliability) the player 
tries to infer the quality of the opponent.  
 
The econometric model 
The econometric model employed in this paper is a Linear Probability Model (LPM) with a 
binary dependent variable which is estimated by OLS with individual fixed effects. A panel 
data approach over eleven years is applied. The model looks like this:  
    
ij ij i j ij X D Y ε γ β α + ′ + + =     (1) 
The fixed effects αj  controls for individual characteristics that are constant over time. i 
denotes the player and j the game (the observation). The dependent variable y takes on the 
value one if the game ended in a draw in ten to nineteen moves and zero otherwise. The 
critical interval 10-19 is compared with  other intervals in a “difference-in-difference” 
approach.  Di  is the variable  of interest and measures the gender or nationality effects, 
respectively.  It takes on the value one if the opponent is a female/same nationality, zero 
otherwise. Xi are control variables and εi the standard error. The model is estimated with 
robust standard errors, clustered at player level as an individual plays more than one game. 
The control variables included are: Elo, Elo difference, age, age-squared, age-teenager, age 
difference and four dummies controlling for the number of encounters between two players. 
Having met only once is the reference group and 2-4 encounters, 5-10 encounters and >10 
encounters control for multiple encounters. I refer to these as the “encounter-dummies” and to 
some extent they control for networks effects, whereas the reference dummy (having met   13 
only once) corresponds to the screening effect. A positive β  implies that the marginal 
probability for a draw, given the move interval, is greater when two female players or 
countrymen meet than when players of different sex or nationality meet.  
Figure 1a demonstrates the hypothetical pattern according to the theoretical model. In 
the critical interval 10-19 both groups prefer to cooperate with people of their own group. 
People of background A have a higher probability of cooperating with people of background 
A than  background B. People of background B have a negative coefficient which indicates 
that the probability of  cooperating  with people of background A  is lower than  when 
cooperating with people of background B. Figure 1b, on the other hand, shows a pattern 
where both groups prefer to cooperate with people of background A. Such patterns are often 
discussed within migration economics in models of social identity in cases where people of a 
minority group prefer to act as if they were of the same background as the dominant group. 





Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Figure 1 reflects the fact that arranged draws typically depend on the players, not on the 
position on the board, and that “normal” draws (in more than twenty moves) typically depend 
on the position, not on the player characteristics. For this reason no differences are expected 
between different background characteristics except for the critical 10-19 interval.  
 
                                                 
6 For references on social identity, “acting white” and “token women”, see Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Fryer 
and Torelli (2010) and Gordon, Pipkin and Spangler (1978), respectively.  
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3    Data and statistics
 
The data in this study were obtained from ChessBase 10, a commercial database collection 
with more than two million chess games played in international chess events. It contains 
about 200,000 players from all over the world. Two levels of data are available, player-
specific information and game-specific information. The name, year of birth, nationality and 
gender of a player are available. For every game there are data on the names and Elo-ratings 
of the two players, year of the game, number of moves and score. The years included in this 
study range from 1997 to 2007 and the minimum Elo-rating required is 2000, above which 
players are considered to be experts.  Regarding the information on a player’s nationality, I 
have grouped the countries in regions based on geographic lines and chess popularity. The 
regions with the highest number of chess players are Western Europe, East Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. These three regions account for about 90 percent of the expert chess 
players in the world. Western Europe alone accounts for 53 percent, East Europe for 24 
percent and the former Soviet Union for about 13 percent.
7
 
 Latin America, North America, 
Africa and Asia account for less than 10 percent. Women have Elo-ratings about a hundred 
points lower than men averaged over the whole sample. The female share varies substantially 
across regions from about 5 percent in Western Europe to 10 percent in East Europe to 14 
percent in the former Soviet Union (see Table 1). The female share has been rising constantly 
in the last two decades and consequently women are much younger on average than male 
chess players. The average male is 35 years old whereas the average female is ten years 
younger. In the former Soviet Union the mean age is much lower and the difference between 
the sexes is not as great as in Western Europe.  
 
                                                 
7 See Table 1 in Gerdes and Gränsmark (2010) for more information.    15 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 gives the female share for each region and for two groups with different playing 
strength, Elo less than 2300 and Elo greater than 2300.
8
 
 Most players with an Elo-rating of 
more than 2300 are professionals or semi-professionals whereas those between 2000 and 
2300 are expert amateurs. There are 125,369 games played by women and 1,423,567 games 
played by men. 111,020 games out of 1,548,936 end in a draw in 10-19 moves. This 
corresponds to 7.2 percent of all games. Of these, 5,194 females and 105,826 males draw in 
10-19 moves. The share of female draws in 10-19 moves is 5,194/111,020=4.7 percent. The 
share of male draws in 10-19 moves is 105,826/1,423,567=7.4 percent.  
4     Results 
This section reports the estimation results for the cultural background characteristics gender 
and nationality. The gender effects are first analyzed from a general perspective and then for 
some subgroups. Estimation results for amateurs and professionals and for different regions 
are discussed. Regarding the nationality effects I first look at the overall pattern and then at 
some selected cases where my intention is to isolate, at least to some extent, the effects of 
geographic proximity and common language.  
 
Gender effects 
Figure 2 displays the MEN/WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficients for draws at different 
move intervals. Table 2 reports the coefficients, standard errors, and significance levels for 
                                                 
8 This cut-off gives roughly half the observations in each group. In the upper-rated group there are fewer players 
although the number of games played by each player is higher.     16 
the results displayed in Figure 2. Recall that the move interval 10-19 is the critical interval 
where cooperation is measured. Figure 2a gives the coefficients corresponding to Column (1) 
in Table 2 where no encounter controls or individual fixed effects are included. Figure 2b 
shows the coefficients for the mainline model in Column (3) where controls for the number of 
encounters are included together with some additional controls and individual fixed effects. 
Subsequently, I refer to the latter approach as the mainline.  
 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
The coefficients for the encounter-dummies are all positive and rising with the number of 
meetings. Thus, the more times the players have met in a chess confrontation the higher is the 
probability that they agreed to an arranged draw. I interpret this as a social networks effect. 
These coefficients are larger for men than for women. The MEN vs. female opponent 
coefficient is negative and significant, revealing that the probability for men to accept 
arranged draws is greater when playing against male opponents than against female 
opponents. The coefficient for the mainline model in Column (3) is -0.016 (see Table 2). The 
coefficients should be interpreted as the marginal probability to cooperate being 1.6 percent 





                                                 
9 The econometric model in this paper is an LPM where “success” in the dependent variable (arranged draws) 
occurs in only 7.2 percent of the cases. This will typically result in seemingly low coefficients. In relative terms 
the size of the gender difference corresponds to about 20-25 percent which is a substantial difference.  
   17 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
The WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficient for the 10-19 interval is non-negative when the 
encounter-dummies are not included as controls (see Columns (1) and (2)). This means that 
females have better (or at least equally good) social networks within the female sex. When, 
however, we include the encounter-dummies the WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficient 
turns negative, implying that women screen women and choose to cooperate with men more 
than with women. The models in Columns (4) and (5) are identical to that of Column (3) but 
for different move intervals, 20-29 and 30-39. The coefficient of interest and the encounter-
dummies decrease substantially in later intervals reflecting the fact that later in the game it is 
the position, not the players, which matters the most. The coefficients for the control variable 
Age difference contain some additional information. The coefficients are strictly negative and 
highly significant implying that cooperation decreases when the age difference increases.  
According to the theoretical screening model in section 2, the WOMEN vs. female 
opponent coefficient is expected to be positive, that is, women communicate easier within the 
female sex than across sexes and can benefit from screening the opposite sex (see Figure 1a). 
Having the same gender characteristics is assumed to facilitate cooperation. When a woman 
plays against a female opponent the marginal probability of an arranged draw is 0.5 percent 
less than when she plays against a male opponent. This finding is the opposite of what is 
predicted by the theoretical model. The pattern could perhaps be explained by a social 
identity model (see Figure 1b). This finding makes it tempting to hypothesize that the pattern 
could  be correlated with the female share. To understand the underlying mechanisms I 
analyze the estimation results for some subgroups with varying female share.      18 
Figure 3 displays the results from estimations for amateurs and professionals, 
respectively. The female share is 12 percent among the amateurs and 5 percent among the 
professionals (see Table 1). The screening and networks effects are substantially weaker in 
the lower-rated group where the female share is higher. For the professionals, however, there 
is a much stronger pattern where both sexes screen women.  
 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
 
In further analysis of the counter-intuitive female behavior Figure 4 presents the estimation 
results at regional level.
10
 
 Figure 4a displays the WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficients 
for the whole population and Figure 4b gives the coefficients for the amateurs, i.e. Elo<2300. 
The purpose is to be able to observe the female cooperative behavior in a subgroup where the 
female share is substantially higher.  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 
The female share in Western Europe is only 5 percent, but10 percent in Eastern Europe and 
14 percent in the former Soviet Union. The WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficient in the 
critical interval is considerably lower for Western Europe, which has the lowest female share. 
The WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficient for the former Soviet Union, with the highest 
                                                 
10 The three main regions correspond to 90 percent of the observations.   19 
female share (14 percent), is also the highest, close to zero. In Figure 4b I show the WOMEN 
vs. female opponent coefficients for each region for the amateurs. For the amateurs the female 
share in Eastern Europe is 15 percent and the coefficient is zero. The female share in the 
former Soviet Union for the amateur players is 32 percent and the corresponding coefficient 
is positive. Women cooperate more with male opponents if the female share is less than 15 
percent. If the female share is greater than 15 percent women cooperate more with female 
opponents than with male opponents. This is relevant because it shows that women will 
screen men and choose to cooperate with women if the female share is high enough.  
As stated in section 2, Lang (1986) writes that the competitive market will tend to 
minimize cooperation through segregation and those costs that cannot be eliminated will be 
borne by the smaller group. Figure 3 demonstrates that, when competition rises, the male 
screening of women increases and female players increase their cooperation with men 
compared with women. The fact that women learn to “speak the male language” when the 
female share is low can be considered to be a cost for women. In continuation, I will refer to 
this cost as the language cost. There is also a second cost related to the fact that the female 
share of arranged draws is lower than for men. As stated in section 3, the share of male 
arranged draws is 7.4 percent whereas the share of female arranged draws is only 4.7 percent. 
Given that men and women have the same preference for arranged draws, one can see the 
difference between 7.4 and 4.7 as a cost for women.
11
Figure 5 displays the female shares for each of the three major regions together with 
the productivity cost. The shares are given for five Elo intervals, 2000-2100, 2100-2200,… 
2400-2900. The productivity cost is defined as the female share of arranged draws minus the 
male share of arranged draws, i.e. a negative productivity cost indicates that there is a 
  I will refer to this cost as the 
productivity cost.   
                                                 
11 The female and male preferences for arranged draws will be discussed below.    20 
productivity cost for women as they achieve fewer arranged draws than desired. The female 
share displayed in Figure 5 has been divided by ten for ease of comparison.  
 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
The productivity cost for the former Soviet Union displays an important feature. The 
gender difference of arranged draws is zero when the female share is above 30 percent, that 
is,  there is no productivity cost.  This suggests that women and men  do  have the same 
preferences for arranged draws but that women have to settle for fewer arranged draws than 
desired when the female share drops below 30 percent. Above an Elo of 2300 in the former 
Soviet Union the productivity cost increases (negatively) when the female share drops. A 
similar pattern is seen for Eastern Europe. The female share in Western Europe is relatively 
low from the outset and it does not drop much with increasing playing strength. Nevertheless, 
for all three regions the productivity cost increases when the female share decreases.  
To see if these visual findings persist after a regression analysis I regress the 
productivity cost and the language cost, respectively, on the female share. To obtain 
subgroups with different levels of female shares I divide the players into Elo groups where 




 The results are reported in Table 3. Thus, the purpose of Regression 1 is to see if the 
productivity cost for females increases when the female share decreases. The purpose of 
Regression 2 is to see if the language cost increases when the female share decreases.    
                                                 
12 It might seem more natural to use countries rather than Elo groups but in many countries there are not enough 
pre-arranged draws between female players. Using Elo groups instead gives more than 600 observations.    21 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
The regression results of Regression 1 in Table 3 show that the productivity cost increases as 
the female share decreases. The coefficient for the female share is positive and statistically 
significant which implies that the higher the female share the lower the productivity cost for 
women. The negative Female share squared  indicates that the correlation is concave. 
Regression 2 shows that the language cost for women increases when the female share 
decreases. The coefficient is significant at the 5 (10) percent level. As Regression 2 considers 
both the player in focus and the opponent, I can restrict the sample to include only the first 
encounter between two players as I want to examine the screening effect, not the networks 
effect. This means that women cooperate more with women when the female share increases.   
Thus, women seem to have the same preferences for arranged draws as men do but they 
are faced with a productivity cost in the shape of fewer arranged draws than desired. This cost 
is negatively correlated with the female share. If a low female share causes costs for women 
then there will be a disincentive for women to participate which will lower the female share 
even further. Such a self-perpetuating scenario was explained by Akerlof (1976). 
Furthermore, it has been stressed in the literature that having a minority status can produce 





                                                 
13 Jennifer Shahade (2005) writes that “the category of women’s chess does not refer to some intrinsically 
female way of playing chess but rather to being a minority in the chess world, which can affect the way a 
woman plays”. (p. 6)    22 
Nationality effects  
An interesting question is whether the findings of the gender analysis are specific to inter-
gender behavior or are rather an effect resulting from the fact that female chess players are a 
minority in a men’s world. For this reason I also study nationality effects. Table 4 reports the 
estimation results when the players have the same nationality compared with when they are of 
different nationalities. The marginal probability for an arranged draw is 1.7 percent greater 
when the players are from the same country. The encounter-dummies show a similar pattern 
to that in the gender model, implying that there are social networks among countrymen that 
increase with the number of encounters. Column (1) gives the results for the whole population 
whereas Column (2) gives the results for males.  
 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
In Figure 5, cooperation between countrymen is compared with cooperation between people 
of different nationalities. Results for Germany and Russia are presented. The coefficients in 
Figure 5 should be interpreted as the probability of cooperation when a Domestic/non-
Domestic player respectively plays against a  Domestic opponent compared with  playing 
against a non-Domestic opponent. A positive coefficient is expected when a German plays 
against a German. A negative coefficient is expected when a non-German plays against a 
German; see Figure 1a for the hypothetical example. The estimation results for Germany and   23 






Figure 6 about here 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that the marginal probability for an arranged draw is about 1.5 percent greater 
when a German/Russian plays against a countryman than when they play against an opponent 
of another nationality. The non-German vs. German opponent coefficient is approximately  
-.012, i.e. there is 1.2 percent less probability of an arranged draw. The non-Russian vs. 
Russian opponent coefficient is -.004. Most players participate in chess events in their home 
countries which create an environment where they belong to the dominant group, that is, the 
share of domestic players is greater than the share of non-domestic players.
15
The dataset employed in this paper originates  from international chess defined as 
games with Elo status, that is, the rating recognized by the International Chess Federation 
(FIDE). As the USA applies a different rating system, games played within the USA, where 
the US rating is used instead of the Elo-rating, are not included in the dataset. This fact 
creates an interesting experiment as practically all games played by Americans are played 
outside the USA. As a consequence, Americans act as “a minority group” and never as a 
dominant group, which would be the case when playing in the home country. The share of 
Americans compared with non-Americans is comparable to the female share in the analysis of 
  
                                                 
14 A similar pattern to that of Germany and Russia was found for all major chess countries in the world such as 
Spain, Argentina, Israel, India, Hungary and others.  
15 This goes for practically all chess events except, naturally, for the absolute world elite. Traveling costs and 
foregone labor income may be relatively high for lower-rated players.    24 
the gender effects. The coefficients for Germans and Russians were positive, implying that 
people cooperate more with countrymen than with others so, hypothetically, we would expect 
a positive sign for the American vs. American coefficient. Figure 7 shows the pattern for 
Americans vs. American opponents and the coefficient is negative just as it was for women 
when the female share was low. Americans living or playing abroad cooperate more with 
non-Americans than with Americans (see Figure 1b).  
 
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
 
The marginal probability for an arranged draw when an American plays against an American 
opponent is about 0.6 percent less  than when s/he plays  against a non-American. The 
implication is that American players have to bear a language cost in line with women in the 
gender analysis. The non-American share of arranged draws is 7.2 percent (7.4 for men) 
whereas the American share of arranged draws is 6.0 percent (4.7 for women).
16
So far, nationality has been analyzed from a general perspective. The concept of 
nationality also includes aspects such as language, geographic proximity and religious beliefs. 
 This means 
that Americans also face a productivity cost. This behavior by the American players is 
important as it is similar to the behavior by women when the female share is low. This 
suggests that the female behavior is not determined by intrinsic gender differences alone but 
to some extent is a result of the demographic composition of the population.    
                                                 
16 The non-American share of arranged draws is calculated as109,119/1,517,343=7.2, i.e. the number of 
arranged draws divided by the total number of games played by non-Americans. The corresponding numbers for 
Americans are 1,901/31,593=6.0. The share of American players is 31,593/1,548,936=2 percent although there 
are probably regional differences. The female share among American players is only 0.2 percent.   25 
In the following, I aim to isolate to some extent the influences of language and geographic 
proximity. Figure 8a shows the coefficients for German vs. German opponents compared 
with playing against a specific nationality. Cooperation is expected to be at its highest when 
the opponent is German but also to be relatively high when the opponent comes from a 
neighboring country and especially when s/he has German as a native language. Figure 8b 
shows the corresponding pattern for  Russian players.    
 
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
 
In Table 5 the coefficients for each interval are given when Germans play against Germans 
compared with playing against players of four other nationalities (French, Spanish, Austrian, 
and Dutch). France, Austria, and the Netherlands are neighboring countries but Spain is not. 
In Austria, the official language is German, as in Germany. Hypothetically, one could expect 
the screening against Spanish players to be the highest whereas Austrian players, who speak 
the same language as the Germans and come from a neighboring country, are expected to be 
less screened. The results confirm the expected pattern. Germans cooperate equally with 
Germans and Austrians (there is no significant difference) but significantly less with the 
French and Dutch, and least of all with Spaniards. 
Table 5 also gives the  coefficients for each interval when Russians play against 
Russians compared with  playing against players from Belarus, Ukraine, Poland,  and the 
Czech Republic. In Belarus, Russian is an official language and is also widely spoken in 
Ukraine. Belarus and Ukraine are also neighboring countries to Russia. Poland and the Czech 
Republic are close but not precisely neighboring countries and Russian is not an official   26 
language (although Polish, Czech, and Russian are all Slavic languages). Russian players 
choose to cooperate more with opponents form Belarus and Ukraine than with players from 
Poland or the Czech Republic; see Table 5 for significance levels.
17
 
   
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 
5     Conclusions
 
The findings reveal that men screen women by cooperating more with men than with women. 
With a female share greater than 15 percent, women screen men by cooperating more with 
women, which is in accordance with the screening model in section 2. With a female share 
below 15 percent, however,  women cooperate more with men than with women. One 
interpretation is that this has to do with social identity where people identify themselves with 
those they encounter the most, i.e. the dominant group. Moreover, with a female share below 
30 percent there is a productivity cost for women as they do not achieve the same share of 
arranged draws as men do. Thus, when the female share drops below 30 percent, women are 
faced with a productivity cost, and when the female share drops below 15 percent, there is 
also  a language cost as women  have to learn the male language. Furtermore, the social 
                                                 
17 Similar patterns are seen for the French who prefer to cooperate with French-speaking Belgian players more 
than with other neighboring nationalities. The pattern is also seen for England although the English prefer to 
cooperate with Americans and Danes rather than with the Irish. The explanation may be owed to religious 
differences or other forms of rivalry (history of conflicts).  
   27 
screening of women increases substantially with increasing competition, i.e. screening is 
more common among stronger players but is rather weak at lower levels. 
By controlling for the number of encounters between two players it is possible to 
distinguish between social networks effects and first-encounter screening. Both sexes have 
better social networks within the sex than across as cooperation increases with the number of 
encounters between two players.  
As regards nationality, this paper finds that countrymen cooperate more than players 
of different nationalities and speaking the same language and geographic proximity are 
important factors for cooperation across nations. In the case of the USA, an interesting 
“experiment” shows that Americans, when in a  complete minority, cooperate less  with 
countrymen than with other nationalities. As this pattern coincides with the findings of female 
cooperation when in a complete minority, this behavior may be more general than restricted 
to one specific country. Moreover, cooperation is more likely to occur between agents of 
similar age. The greater the age difference between the agents,  the less  the degree of 
cooperation.  
One objection that could be raised against this study is that it focuses on a non-
representative selection of people. For this reason we should be careful not to generalize the 
results too far. Also, as the female share among chess players is low it is possible that the 
motivation that drives women to play chess is different from the motivation that drives men. 
On the other hand, similar conditions may be present for high-status professions. The dataset 
also has various strengths as it contains international register data with a large number of 
observations in a panel data structure which allows us to control for individual fixed effects, 
age, sex, nationality and playing strength. The fact that it permits controlling for possible 
gender differences in productivity, thanks to the Elo-rating, makes the findings very strong.   28 
Having such powerful econometric tools at hand in a two-agent game is rather rare in 
practice.  
In the introduction I sought to establish a link between expert chess players and 
employees in the high-status or intellectually demanding professions by claiming that there 
are similarities in skills, intelligence,  and dedication to work and training. As a policy 
implication, this paper gives support to quota-based admission of women and minority groups 
for these sections of the labor market. This follows because if women cooperate more with 
men than with women then the fall of the female share will be self-perpetuating, as explained 
by Akerlof (1976). For this reason the female share may have to be stimulated until it reaches 
a certain level. The findings should also be taken into account when new theoretical models 
on the subject are developed as the behavioral change by the smaller group when the share of 
that group decreases has still not been modeled.  
The results of this paper give some support to the screening model by Cornell and 
Welch (1996) which states that interpretation of verbal and non-verbal signals between two 
people is facilitated when they have a similar cultural background. The screening model does 
not, however, explain why women choose to cooperate more with men when the female share 
is low. The concept of social identity may play a role as an underlying explanation of the 
findings. An alternative explanation is offered by the theory of the two queens which implies 
that if a woman cannot be the best of all players, she will at least be the best of her subgroup, 
in this case the best among women. Thus, the smaller the female share, the higher the rivalry 
among the remaining women. Such a theory could also explain the behavior of the American 
players.  
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Table 1 – The female share for different regions and playing strengths.  
female share  in %  Elo<2300  Elo>2300  all 
Former Soviet Union  32  9  14 
Eastern Europe  15  5  10 
Western Europe  6  3  5 
All   12  5  8   33 
Table 2 – MEN/WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficients and controls.   
Regression 1: MEN vs. female opponent 
  move 10-19    move 20-29  move 30-39 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5) 
Female opponent  -.0189  -.0191  -.0160    -.0105  -.0051 
(.0012)***  (.0011)***  (.0011)***    (.0011)***  (.0011)*** 
2-4 encounters 
 
No  No  .0336    .0116  .0062 
    (.0008)***    (.0006)***  (.0005)*** 
5-10 encounters  No  No  .0710    .0262  .0075 
    (.0025)***    (.0015)***  (.0012)*** 
>10 encounters  No  No  .0898    .0367  .0170 
    (.0089)***    (.0036)***  (.0030)*** 
Age difference  -.0006  -.0006  -.0007    -.00008  .0001 
(.0001)***  (.00002)***  (.00002)***    (.00002)***  (.00002)*** 
Indiv. fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Number of obs.: 1,423,567 
 
Regression 2: WOMEN vs. female opponent 
  move 10-19    move 20-29  move 30-39 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5) 
Female opponent  .0010  .0006  -.0053    .0033  .0075 
(.0015)  (.0015)  (.0015)***    (.0016)**  (.0016)*** 
2-4 encounters 
 
No  No  .0178    .0081  .0038 
    (.0017)***    (.0018)***  (.0016)** 
5-10 encounters  No  No  .0468    .0148  .0121 
    (.0055)***    (.0031)***  (.0033)*** 
>10 encounters  No  No  .0551    .0153  .0012 
    (.0188)***    (.0109)  (.0102) 
Age difference  -.0006  -.0006  -.0006    -.0002  -.0001 
(.0001)***  (.0001)***  (.0001)***    (.0001)***  (.00002)*** 
Indiv. fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Number of obs.: 125,369 
Notes: One encounter is used as a reference group. Robust standard errors, clustered at player level. Additional 
controls: age, age-squared, age-teenager, age difference, elo, elo difference, number of encounters and individual 
fixed effects. Standard errors within parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%   34 
Table 3 - Dep. Var in Regression 1:  productivity cost and Regression 2:  language cost.  
Dependent variable  Regression 1: dep var: prod. cost    Regression 2: dep var: lang. cost  
  Weighted OLS  OLS    Weighted OLS  OLS 
           
Female share    .536  .554    .754  .499 
  (.170)***  (.147)***    (.322)**  (.290)* 
Female share squared  -1.660  -1.852    -2.838  -1.641 
  (.760)**  (.623)***    (1.402)**  (1.177) 
First encounter  -  -    yes  yes 
Number of observations   677  677    628  628 
Notes: The weighted OLS has been weighted by the number of games played at each Elo level. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at player level. Standard errors within parentheses.  * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 
5% level, *** significant at 1% level.    35 
Table 4 –_Dep. var.: arranged draws in 10-19 moves, estimated with OLS and fixed effects.  
Dep var arr draws 10-19 moves  all     males  
  (1)    (2) 
Same nationality  .0173  (.0007)***    .0173  (.0008)*** 
Age difference  -.0007  (.00002)***    -.0007  (.00002)*** 
2-4 encounters  .0293  (.0008)***    .0309  (.0008)*** 
5-10 encounters  .0620  (.0023)***    .0650  (.0025)*** 
>10 encounters  .0801  (.0082)***    .0831  (.0087)*** 
Individual fixed effects  Yes  -    yes  - 
Number of observations:   1,548,936      1,423,567   
Notes: additional controls are: Elo, Elo difference, age, age-sq, teenage, number of moves. One encounter is 
used as reference.  Robust and clustered standard errors. Standard errors within parentheses.  * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.    36 
Table 5 – Coefficients and standard errors corresponding to Figure 8. 
Country   1-9  10-19  20-29  30-39  40-49 
Germany vs. Ger/France  .0047***  .0168***  .0147***  -.007  .007 
Germany vs. Ger/Spain  .0052*  .0355***  .0293***  -.0132*  .0087 
Germany vs. Ger/Austria  .0005  .0049  .0059  -.0007  .0122*** 
Germany vs. Ger/Netherlands  .0056***  .0195***  .0091***  -.0037  -.0046 
           
Russia vs. Rus/Belarus  .0051*  -.001  .0111*  .0029  .0067 
Russia vs. Rus/Ukraine  .0041**  -.0085**  -.0145***  -.0047  .0007 
Russia vs. Rus/Poland  .0076***  .0327***  .003  -.0133**  .0000 
Russia vs. Rus/Czech Rep  -.001  .0254***  .0032  .0033  -.0053 
Notes: Control variables are: Elo, elo difference, age, age-sq, age-teenager, age difference, number of meetings, 
fixed effects. Robust and clustered standard errors are used but not reported. Separate regressions are run for 
each pair of countries and for each interval (1-9, 10-19…). The significance level is instead indicated by:  * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   37 
Figure 1 – Two groups with different cultural backgrounds: (a) where both groups prefer to 
cooperate with people of the same background, (b) where both groups prefer to cooperate 
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Figure 2 – MEN/WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficients. (a) Without encounter-dummies 
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(a) Without encounter-dummies and FE.   (b) Mainline with encounter-dummies and FE. 
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Figure 3 –  MEN/WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficients. (a) Amateurs – mainline.  
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Figure 4 - WOMEN vs. female opponent coefficients for separate regions. Same controls as in 
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(a) Women vs. female opponents– all Elo-ratings  (b) Women vs. female opponents– Elo<2300 
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Figure 5 – The female share divided by ten for each region and the productivity cost. Note: 
“20-21”=2000-2100 in Elo. (a)  Former Soviet Union. (b) Eastern Europe. (c) Western 
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Figure 6 –  Germany, Russia: playing against their own respective nationality compared with 
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Figure 7 – Americans/non-Americans playing against Americans compared with playing 
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Figure 8 – (a) Germans when playing against Germans compared with opponents from 
France, Spain, Austria and the Netherlands. (b) Russians playing against Russians compared 
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